OPEC+ producers have added 1.93m b/d to the market since March 2025, falling slightly short of their target increase of around 2.6m b/d, according to latest Petroleum Economist estimates. This appears to be notable outcome for a group whose members have very different priorities. In October, they increased their output by 200,000b/d, with the core OPEC-9 members accounting for 190,000b/d of that rise.
Saudi Arabia led the increase in crude output during October, posting the largest gain among OPEC-9 members. Anticipating the higher volumes, Riyadh adjusted its Official Selling Prices (OSPs) for December cargoes to Asian buyers, its primary export market. Iraq added 40,000b/d to its production, supported by increased flows through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Pipeline. Nigeria recovered 30,000b/d following September’s disruption, caused by industrial action. The UAE also registered a modest month-on-month rise of 20,000b/d. Overall, compliance across the OPEC-9 group remained near 100%—with only Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq maintaining spare capacity, while the rest continued to operate at full output.
Outside the core group, non-OPEC participants delivered mixed results. Russia was the largest contributor to production increase, although sustaining elevated export levels remains a challenge amid increasing sanctions and drone attacks. It is likely to prove difficult for Russia to increase output, at least in the short run. Due to maintenance at the Tengiz oilfield, Kazakh output fell but stayed above target. Other OPEC+ countries have been producing at near their capacity.
End-of-year supply and demand forecasts remain highly uncertain due to several conflicting factors, including trade tensions and inconsistent economic growth. The IEA and OPEC have significantly different estimates for demand growth in 2025. The IEA sees an increase of around 700,000b/d, while OPEC sees it at 1.3m b/d. The IEA has recently published its estimate of so-called missing barrels (unaccounted-for discrepancies in supply-demand data) at 1.47m b/d. If history is a guide, these barrels often reappear as demand.
Like demand, supply estimates have their own issues. Oil-at-sea (crude and condensates) volumes have jumped to almost 1.3b bl, according to Vortexa. This does not include floating storages. Some of this could be sanctioned oil from Russia, Iran and Venezuela and may be discharged once refiners see some easing of sanctions.
Chinese puzzle
Chinese oil stockpiling has also been an enigma for the market this year. As Beijing does not publish its oil inventory data, analysts must rely on data about Chinese imports, production and refinery runs to extract these numbers. However, this method is prone to errors. Some volumes might be unaccounted for, especially if processed by independent refiners, as these refiners are not covered by official statistics. Similarly, there are timing mismatches, as import, production, and refinery data are reported on different schedules and may reflect different timeframes. Some crude may be stored in offshore tanks, especially during price arbitrage plays, which are not reflected in domestic inventory estimates.
OPEC+ is aware of difficulties in assessing oil supply and demand but is also conscious of increasing supply compared to demand. As a result, it decided to pause or end its production target increases. There are two reasons why this decision might have to be quickly adjusted. If the US and its allies enforce sanctions against Russia, Iran and Venezuela strictly, demand could exceed supply. Demand could also be higher than expected due to lower tariffs and strong economic growth. In this case, the world might need more oil from countries with surplus capacity. In contrast, surplus oil might start appearing in onshore storages and, at a later stage, in offshore floating storages. This could force OPEC+ to revert to cutting production.
While it has always been difficult to forecast supply and demand balance, 2025 has proven especially challenging. Only history will tell who may be right: OPEC or the IEA. But once the decision has been taken to increase or to decrease supply, it takes time before its impact can be reversed. In some instances, it might be too late.
FIG.1: OPEC+ PRODUCTION SURVEY
| Oct 25 | Sep 25 | ||||
| 0.00 | |||||
| 0.00 | |||||
| 58% | |||||
| 99% | |||||
| 0.01 | |||||
|
0.03 |
|||||
| 10.00 | 0.08 | 10.02 | |||
| 100% | |||||
| 0.000 | |||||
| -0.050 | |||||
| - |
|||||
| Oct 25 | Sep 25 | ||||
| 0.00 | |||||
| Bahrain | |||||
| -0.11 | |||||
| 0.10 | 9.49 | ||||
| 0.02 | |||||
| 0.01 | 13.27 | 102% | |||
| Sep 25 | |||||
| 0.00 |
Source: Petroleum Economist
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